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ABSTRACT 
 
How discourse explains the actorness: the case of “shrinking civic space” in the 
statements of the EU delegations. 
 
This study aims to examine how systemic factors shape the capabilities of a normative actor 
to project its power though the discourse. By looking into the statements of EU delegations 
related to shrinking civic space this study will identify patterns and variations in the EU 
discourse depending on the level of repression in the third country. We will claim that in the 
countries where civic space is closed – the space for exercising normative action gets also 
extremely limited despite the assumption that severe violations should entail more normative 
action. The trend of shrinking civic space will be regarded as reflecting global struggle 
between liberal and non-liberal agendas over what is to be considered as normal. Driven by 
social constructivism and critical discourse analysis, the study concludes with supporting the 
initial claim and providing evidence for limited capabilities of the EU to openly stand for 
civic freedoms in the closed countries. Overall research contributes to the scholarship on 
normative actorness, EU democracy and human rights promotion, and application of mixed 
methodologies for conducting textual analysis. Wholesome mapping of the discourse of EU 
delegations on shrinking civic space may serve a building block for further enquiries. 
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Introduction 
 
Pressure on civil society in the recent years has reached its peak. According to 
Guardian “human rights groups around the world are facing their biggest crackdown in a 
generation as a wave of countries pass restrictive laws and curtail activity” (Sherwood 2015). 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law reports that between 2012 and 2015, more than 
120 laws restricting civic freedoms were proposed or implemented in 60 countries (Rutzen 
2015). In the same line, Civil Society Watch Report 2017 informs that attacks on civic 
freedoms occurred in at least 106 countries, which means that violations of civic freedoms 
“have become the norm rather than exception” (State of Civil Society Report 2017) . 
Combined with financial constraints of civil society actors, the restrictions put on civic 
freedoms severely challenge path to inclusive societies, leading to tension, instability and 
conflict (Carothers 2016). This indicates a global trend often referred to as shrinking civic 
space.  
But what is the root of this phenomena? Going beyond the surface, we will find out 
that the indicated increase of repressions reflects a larger systemic struggle between liberal 
and non-liberal agendas. Indeed, civic space restrictions in most cases are justified by the 
necessity to protect state sovereignty, while foreign support for civil society as well as 
promotion of democracy and human rights are connected to liberal values and liberal regimes 
(Gershman & Michael 2006). Academic studies have conducted mapping the phenomenon 
of closing space, identifying its scope and depth, its characteristics and evolution over time 
(Wolff & Poppe 2015, Rutzen 2015, Carothers 2016; Gershman&Allen 2006; Dupuy et al. 
2014). In the meanwhile, according to Jonas Wolff and Annika Elena Poppe “existing 
accounts largely ignore, or deliberately downplay the normative dimension of the problem 
at hand” (Wolff & Poppe 2015). By viewing restrictions on civic space through the lenses 
of global struggle over what is to be considered as normal, our study aims to explore the link 
between systemic factors (such as level of oppression) and capabilities of the libel actors to 
project their norms through the discourse in the repressed countries. We will assume that 
power relations can be exercised and negotiated in a discourse (Fairclough and Wodak 
1997). The normative actor we focus on will be the EU.  
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The EU is positioning itself as guardian of democracy, principals of good 
governance, fundamental civic and political rights such as freedom of expression, assembly 
and association. The best protection for the security of the EU is seen “in a world of well-
governed democratic states” and the most effective solution for strengthening world-order 
according to the Council lies in spreading good governance, supporting reforms, establishing 
the rule of law, and protecting human right (Council, 2003, p. 12). Regarding shrinking civic 
space, the European Parliament reported that the EU has reiterated a commitment to address 
this problem in the last three or four years. As report holds “the shrinking space problem is 
on its way to being mainstreamed at the heart of EU foreign policy (European Parliament 
2017)”. In this context it should be also indicated that possibilities of the EU to exercise 
international actorness and project its norms have substantially increased due to appearance 
of High Representative for the EU Foreign Affairs and EU's diplomatic service (Bretherton 
2006). As indicated by the fist High Representative Catherine Ashton we can compare human 
rights, democracy and rule of law with “a silver thread that runs through everything EU does in 
external relations” (Ashton 2010). In the same speech she stated that the appearance of EEAS is 
strengthening the ability of the EU to speak out with one voice (Ashton 2010) which is quite essential 
for driving forward often contested normative agenda.  
Considering all the above, we might assume that the more civic space is repressed– 
the more vocal EU delegations in a particular country would be. But this apparently is not 
the case and here is the puzzle. By means of the current research, we will test this hypothesis 
and try to falsify it. We will claim that in the countries with closed space – the space for 
exercising normative action and projecting norms through the discourse gets also limited. 
Testing of the hypothesis will happen by comparing statements issued by EU delegations in 
countries with closed in repressed space (as defined by CIVCUS). 
 
• Our research question would be: How does discourse of EU 
delegations on shrinking civic space vary depending on the level of repression and 
what does it tell us about the capabilities and constrains of the EU normative 
actorness? 
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Thus, our research will aim to provide explanation for the capabilities and systemic 
contains of the EU normative actorness by conducting a wholesome analysis of statements 
on shrinking civic space issued by EU delegations in third countries. Now, we will shortly 
outline the structure of our study. In the first section we will introduce central concepts such 
as actorness, normative actorness, EU diplomacy and shrinking civic space. Our goal here 
would be to provide definitions for the concepts, outline academic debates and show how it 
relates to our study. Then we will present social constructivism and discourse analysis as 
theoretical premises for our research followed by motivation for the choice of statements as 
a material. Lastly, before engaging into analysis of the statements we will outline our 
research design explaining, inter alia, methodology, framework for analysis and limitations 
of our study.  
 
1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
While aiming to get an insight into capabilities and systemic constrains of the EU 
normative actorness we will first look into academic debates on the higher level of 
abstraction on EU actorness in general. Then, going down to the ladder which is closer 
related to our enquiry we will map out existing research on normative aspects of EU 
foreign policy. We will also be interested in literature focused on EU diplomacy and its 
role in promoting normative agenda. Lastly, we will motivate the choice of shrinking civic 
space as a theme and provide its definition. In each of the sections we will relate existing 
scholarship to our study and show where our contribution will be placed. 
 
1.2 EU actorness and criteria of actorness 
 
The nature of EU actorness and the EU role in global affairs has been in the focus of 
academic debate since 1970s. The central point of contestation revolves around the fact that 
actorness as a concept was initially designed within the realist school of thought as a feature 
of a nation-state that depicts its capability to project power and influence other actors on the 
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international arena (Beauguitte et al 2015, Dryburgh 2008, Huigens & Niemann 2011). And 
although the international system increasingly got populated by important non-state entities, 
as Wong and Hill affirm “the dominant paradigm in international relations still conceives of 
foreign policy as essentially the domaine réservé of sovereign governments, and therefore 
exclusive to the states (Wong and Hill, 2011: 3)”. 
Using this line of argumentation, scholars continue questioning the status of the EU 
actorness. Some of them claim that since the EU is neither a state in its traditional realist 
understanding nor a political entity which is constituted, it cannot act rationally and thus, its 
actorness cannot be regarded as complete (Rosamond 2005). In the same vein, some scholars 
perceive the EU as an actor only to the extent it has a property of a state, which also stands 
for a limited version of what actorness may entail (Kratochvil 2013, Cmakalova& Rolenc 
2012).  
The alternative version of looking on EU actorness and role in global affairs is 
considering it as sui generis entity. This particular approach will be applied in our research 
since it provides the most sutable lences for investigating normative aspects of EU policies. 
Accordingly, EU falls into completelly separate category in relation to other actors and is 
perceived as having a unique potential to influence international environment. As Allen and 
Smith contend, since state-centric paradigm excludes a lot of what is distinctive and 
significant about the EU, drifting away from it provides better opportunities to appreciate 
and evaluate the influence of European Union in international politics (Allen and Smith 
1990).  
Along with debate on the nature of the EU actorness, another remarcable discussion 
has developed around the criteria which are to be fullfilled to be regarded as an international 
actor. Here we should first mention contribution of Gunnar Sjöstedt who suggested that to 
be regarded as international actor European Community should meet two conditions: 
internal cohesion and autonomy or separadness from what constitutes its internal 
environment (Sjöstedt 1977). Inspired by emerging process of European integartion Sjöstedt 
also introduced a concept of actor capability meaning “the capacity of an autonomous unit 
to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” 
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(Sjöstedt 1977). Noteworthy, this concept successfully travelled beyound European 
intergation theory into scholarship on international actorness in general (Drieskens, 2017).  
The following academic breakthrough on the nature and criteria of EU actorness 
occured in 1990-s (Drieskens, 2017) most important being two pieces of research, - one by 
Bretherton and Vogler (1999) and the other one - by Jupille and Caporaso (1998). To explain 
actorness Bretherton and Vogler have buit a framework consisting of three pilars - presense, 
opportunity and capability. Jupille and Caporaso presented different understanding of 
actorness, incorporating in it such dimentions as recognition, autonomy, authority and 
cohesion. Interestingly, even though those pieces of reseach originated approximately at the 
same time, were investigating EU in similar spheres, were based on the same literature, and 
were both aiming to provide operationalisations of actorness, as  Drieskens points out, there 
were some important differences in those studies both in approach and research ambission 
(Drieskens 2017). Namely, Bretherton and Vogler concentrated on EU as a sui generis entity 
the actorness of which being also sui generis. On the other hand, Jupille and Caporaso were 
trying to develop a framework which will be relevant for studies beyound the EU. Another 
difference is that while both studies were focusing on variables linked to internal funktioning 
of the EU,  the one of Bretherton and Vogler put a special emphasis on systemic variables 
(such as opportunity) and variables related to identity (such as presence) (Drieskens 2017). 
In this way, contribution of Bretherton and Vogler serves as one of the majour sourses of 
theoretical inspiration for the current research.  
The aforementioned ways of operationalizing actorness subsequently provided basis 
for investigation of EU actorness for other scholars, who proposed different variations and 
combinations of the proposed criteria, adjusting them to their respective purposes (as 
example, Groen or Beauguitte). Howerer, it is relevant to keep in mind that while tailored 
criteria may enable to explore in detail specific aspect of EU functioning, “mixing and 
matching” may result in blurring the research field and making it more complicated to 
compare over time and over policy. Operationalization of EU actorness turned out to be not 
an easy task. Many researchers emphasise that criteria used for evaluating actorness often 
overlap, and even contradict each other (Groen and Niemann 2013, Kissack 2008). Those 
authors claim that commonly used critea of actorness are not fully reflecting the complexity 
of the EU nature (Costa 2013), are limitated by inward-looking attitude (Niemann and 
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Bretherton 2013) and do not separate EU actions from actions of it’s member states (Gering 
et al 2013). The suggestion of redefining the existing criteria doen’t seem to remedy the 
problem, neither does the suggestion to take inspiration from broader theories (Gering et al 
2013).  
It seems crucial however to strive for conceptual clarity while exploring the EU 
actorness. Thus, current research will be based on the assumption that the EU is a sui generis 
entity with supranational identity which is operating in the constantly changing global 
system. Regarding criteria of actorness, current research will adhear to the framework 
developed by Bretherton and Vogler consisting of presense, opportunity and capability. 
In this way, we will avoid ‘mixing and matching’ which usually comes as a result of 
introducing new criteria. Moreover, the proposed framework enables to look into systemic 
variables such as opportunity structure which is essential for reaching the objectives of our 
research. The novelty of our study will lie in the fact that we will not discuss criteria of 
actorness one by one, instead, we will aim to look at how those criteria relate to each 
other. To be more concrete, we will to test how the opportunity structure shapes the presence 
and capability of the EU normative actorness. Having said that, we proceed to the following 
section which provides an overwiev on the normative dimention of EU actorness, and what 
aspects of it will be relevant or applicable in the context of our research enquiry.  
 
1.2 EU as a normative power 
“Defining the EU’s foreign policy in normative terms means that the EU’s power cannot be reduced 
to either military or purely economic means; rather, it ‘works through ideas, opinions and conscience” 
 Thomas Diez & Ian Manners (2007) 
Actorness and role of the EU in international politics is closely linked to the concept 
of normative power, which has been introduced by Ian Manners in 2002 (Manners, 2002). 
As Richard Whitman contends, this article of Manners as well as his further contributions 
have provoked “a neo-normative turn” in theorizing EU role and presence on the 
international arena (Whitman, 2013). The debate namely revolved around principles and 
values, ideas and visions which EU is adhering to and which explain EU’s unique identity 
(Manners 2010, Youngs 2004). This debate is quite essential to consider while developing 
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theoretical underpinning for the current research since it is the normative dimension of EU 
actorness we are going to closely investigate. As Maull indicates, the pursuit of rule of law, 
democracy and social justice, as well as multilateral approach to international relations all 
stand for EU normative foundation (Maull, 2000). 
First of all, we should notice that even though Manners was the first researcher who 
coined the concept “normative power” with regards to EU, the ideas around norms and 
values in politics as well as uniqueness of the EU power are not that novel. For instance, in 
early 60s Edward Carr marked that power over opinion exists separately from military or 
economic power (Carr, 1962). Later on, Duchêne attributed to the EC the quality of “idée 
force” which is capable of projecting ideas of Europe to the broader political settings 
(Duchêne, 1973). Galtung in his turn provided idea of “ideological power” being structural 
resource while penetrating and shaping the will of its recipient (Galtung 1973). For the last 
two decades, normative theory has been developed and actively used in the academic 
scholarship providing insights on normative dimension of power and actorness (Cochrane, 
1999). And lines with normative power EU has been described as 'civilian power” (Duchêne 
1972), ethical power (Aggestam 2008), quiet superpower (Moravscic 2002), ‘transformative 
power Europe’ (Grabbe 2006), responsible power (Mayer and Vogd 2006). 
However, despite all the flourishing debate, it is the normative power of Manners 
which became the integral umbrella concept in the scholarship provoking and facilitating the 
alternative conceptualization of EU role in the global affairs and neo-normative shift in its 
theorizing. While Duchêne and Galtung introduced and established “the basics”, Manners 
initiated a new fresh wave of re-thinking EU essence, actions and impacts instead of taking 
them for granted (Manners, 2006). Noteworthy, according to Manners, the reasoning behind 
introducing the concept of normative power is rooted in the necessity to frame the politics 
of post-Cold War world into a more principle-oriented way to capture the leading role of the 
EU in promoting democracy, human rights and rule of law (Whitman 2013 Neonormative 
turm). This lies very central to our research; thus, normative power will be taken as one of 
central pillars of our theoretical framework in line with critical constructivism and critical 
discourse analysis which will be elaborated in detail in the following section. Consequently, 
it is important to emphasize which aspects of “normative power” debate is relevant for 
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dealing with our inquiry and how specifically “normative power” concept frames our 
research enquiry.  
Thus, we shall pose a question: what does it mean to be normative? Manners has 
answered this question by stating that being normative implies altering norms, perceptions 
and standards of the world affairs, which are bound by being state-focused (Manners, 2008). 
By accepting Manners framework, we are going to reach out beyond state-centric approach 
in our research, assuming that international arena is populated by different actors of different 
character. Adding to this, we would place an emphasis on the importance of using discursive 
structures for building perceptions of what is normal in the increasingly multipolar as well 
as strive to understand what the discourse itself might tell us about the normative nature of 
its creator. Since normative theorizing is primarily focused on setting standards and diffusing 
norms rather than exercising economic or military power (Diez and Manners, 2007), it is by 
means of normative theorizing we are going to achieve the objectives of the current research.  
According to Manners, there are two aspects of power which is normative: being 
normative and being inclined to act in a normative way (Manners 2002, Whitman 2013). 
Explanation to being normative according to Manners lies mainly in a hybrid nature of the 
EU as an entity which combines in itself elements of being supranational and 
intergovernmental at the same time. Historical context and legal treaty-based 
constitutionalism add two more angles to this explanation (Manners 2002). However, being 
normative and influencing others by being rather than by acting won’t be explanatory line 
for the current research even though it is one of the strongest claims of normative power 
theorizing (Manners 2002). Instead, we will be more interested in the other aspect of 
normative power, namely, acting in a normative way. Since EU acts in a normative way 
due to its normative nature we assume that we may draw conclusions on the normative nature 
of the EU by looking into EU actions. In this regard, we will follow the advice of Aggestam 
to concentrate more on what EU does than what it is (Aggestam 2008). By acting in a 
normative way in the current research we will mean projecting interests and norms by the 
means of diplomatic rhetoric’s which will be explained in more detail in the following 
section. We will assume that analysis of the acting part will enable us to draw conclusions 
about the nature of “the normative beast”. In the context of our research acting of the EU 
delegation will lie in issuing a statement related to shrinking civic space issues.  
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Noteworthy, while many authors focus on the effectiveness of EU action (Brattberg 
and Rhinard 2013, Drieskens 2013) or inconsistency between rhetorical promises and 
actions on the ground (Bosse, 2013), we will add to existing literature by exploring what 
normative action tells us about the nature of the EU as a normative actor. Moreover, we will 
try to find out how such systemic factor as the level of repression on civic space constrains 
the normative actorness of the EU. 
Importantly, being normative and acting in normative way does not imply being 
naïve. Jan Hornat in his research provides convincing support related to this statement. 
Taking democracy promotion as an example, he contends that democracy promotion should 
not be viewed as solely representing the normative aspect of EU foreign policy since 
strategic pay-offs of this policy are great (Hornat 2016). Following his argument democracy 
promotion may be analyzed from geostrategic perspective as shaping attitudes and 
perceptions of the countries who currently find themselves in the period of transition (Hornat 
2016). Another author has importantly mentioned that multilateralism and ‘soft crisis 
management’ promoted by the EU possibly have strategic underpinning (Simon 2012). 
Thus, in the current study we won’t assume that being normative and being pragmatic are 
mutually exclusive stances. On the opposite, by exploring EU rhetoric’s on shrinking civic 
space we will try to find out the structural logic behind EU behavior.  
We also need to emphasize that our research will be particularly interested in 
understanding how the capacity of acting normatively is affected by power shifts in the 
international system. This strand is quite novel in the field of normative or neo-normative 
theorizing. Here we should mention the contribution made by Kavalski who investigated 
normative struggle between EU and China. His findings suggest that recognition is of crucial 
importance for promoting normative agenda since normative power is the one who got 
recognition from “the others” (Kavalski 2006). In the current research, we won’t aim to 
investigate the competition between different norms per se, but use the claim of competing 
agendas as bedrock for understanding the restrictions which EU “normative power” is 
facing.  
Lastly, the concept of ‘structural foreign policy’ is worth mentioning since it is 
related to the normative power framework, as well as reflects general theoretical angle which 
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our research aims to undertake. In comparison with traditional foreign policy, structural 
foreign policy is targeting economic and social structures of third parties in the middle and 
long term using different tools (such as diplomatic measures, sanctions, etc) (Tello 2001; 
Whitman 2013). In the case of EU, the ambition is to exercise this structural power in 
“enduring and sustainable manner” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008). Our research will 
strive to see whether EU is structural and consistent in the way it uses its normative tools. 
Thus, the following section will explain more the fundamentals of EU diplomacy and how 
this field will turn into a testing ground for our study.   
 
1.3 EU diplomacy  
 
Norms are being diffused through particular channels and diplomacy is one of them. 
In relation to this, scholarship has pointed out that the EU has substantially advanced its 
position as an international actor due to Lisbon Treaty (1992) and, specifically, due to 
appearance of High Representative for the EU Foreign Affairs and EU's diplomatic service 
- European External Action Service (EEAS) (Bretherton 2006). 
More recently, the concept of a 'European system of external action' has been 
introduced (Beauguitte et al, 2015) which again indicated strengthening of the EU position 
in external relations. The prototypes of EU delegations existed as representations of 
European Commission long before Lisbon but the scope and possibilities for their 
performance couldn’t be compared with those ‘embassies for Europe’ we have got 
nowadays. This whole process is remarkably called by Austermann as “centralization of 
European diplomacy” and depicts growth of the network of EU delegations, their increased 
role in coordinating activities of the member states, growing unity in external representation 
and developed diplomatic professionalism (Austermann 2014). 
Thus, there are solid reasons to contend that the EU is gradually developing 
numerous ways to diffuse its norms and express its voice by diplomatic means, which in 
many instances are alike to those which are at the disposal of the states (Ginsberg 2001, 
Voncina 2011). On the other hand, this advancement and centralization of the EU diplomacy 
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signifies dissolution of state sovereignty in favor of other entities, such as those with 
supranational features (Austermann 2014).  
EU’s diplomacy has got characteristics of multi-level system of representation and 
communication, giving the reason to call the nature of EU diplomacy as hybrid (Smith et 
al 2015). It is important to keep in mind though that sui generis character of the EU has direct 
implications on the way EU diplomacy operates, entailing both - opportunities and 
limitations. The international status and credibility of the EU in its diplomatic relations still 
haven’t been resolved by Lisbon treaty (Smith et al 2015) even though it called for using 
new instruments and tools in diplomacy and strengthened institutional set up. There are 
serious tensions on different levels between agents and institutions which complicates the 
pursuit of strategic, structural and transformational diplomacy (Smith et al 2015). Many 
scholars are focusing on this particular puzzle, namely, how interaction between member 
states within the EU affect the EU actorness, coherence of its action and the unity of 
representation (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008, Smith 2004). Our study, however, will presume 
that the voice of the EU delegations on issues related to shrinking civic space already 
represents the result of multilevel negotiations. Thus, we won’t be interested in looking into 
the game of interests and power which every time is being played out on the different levels 
(domestic and international being an example) to achieve unity on certain action (Putman 
1988).  
With regards to other types of constrains and opportunities of the EU diplomacy, 
we should refer to Hocking and Smith who summarized them in a framework consisting of 
three elements: boundaries, capacity and legitimacy (Hoking and Smith 2011). 
As for boundaries, it is stated that the boundaries of the EU diplomacy were 
expanding gradually over past couple of decades. But as for the role of EU diplomacy, we 
should note that the views and opinions expressed on this subject are rather contradictory. 
On the one hand, some scholars comment that the added value of the EU diplomacy at best 
lies in complementing national embassies and Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Boomgaarden 
et al., 2009). Others, give a more pessimistic prospective stating that the new-born European 
diplomatic service may become just another institution in the jungle of other EU intuitions 
in Brussels with modest or no impact at all (Adebahr, 2013, Vaisse 2010). On the other side, 
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some academics argue that EEAS may indeed challenge the traditional structure of state 
embassies and even their existence (Murdoch et al., 2013, Sek, 2012). That is how the 
centralization of the EU diplomacy may achieve its peak (Smith et al 2015). After all, the 
boundaries the EU diplomacy did expand even though the diplomacy itself it still viewed as 
belonging mainly to the realm of high politics (Glarbo, 1999).  
While discussing the capacity, it is stated that diplomacy of the European Union 
has been constantly facing legal and institutional challenges, some of those originating from 
the demand to act on the ad hoc basis in the context of flux international environment (Smith 
et al 2015). Along with legal and institutional aspects, another difficulty appeared from the 
diffusion of agency in the foreign policy of the European Union which made it complicated 
to define the resources for pursuing European tasks. Thus, the allocation of the resources 
which underpin the EU capacity to operate still has not been fully resolved and defined by 
the treaties and treaty-revisions which result in serious tensions and disputes. In addition to 
this, many scholars lift up the question of 'capability expectation gap' meaning and proving 
that in many cases the stated objectives of the EU diplomacy and external action do not meet 
the achieves made on the ground (Hill 1993, Nielsen 2013). 
Finally, legitimacy of the EU external action has also provoked reasonable amount 
of scholarly attention. While talking about legitimacy we should cover both its aspects – 
internal and external. Internal legitimacy touches upon the already mentioned discussion on 
the difficulty to fuse voices coming from different levels and institutions of EU into single 
voice.  According to Smith, the appearance of newly established European system of 
diplomacy can be regarded as a heroic effort to maintain legitimacy through institutional 
arrangements (Smith el al 2015). However, leaving this discussion aside, current study will 
be more interested in external aspects of legitimacy. We will assume that the EU voice on 
shrinking civic space issues channeled by EU delegations is a way to legitimate to EU 
policies in human rights and democracy promotion. Thus, in terms of representation and 
communication this type of diplomatic action presents the EU as normative actor which 
accounts for building its normative identity internally and accounts for being perceived as 
being normative actor by third parties. The term of legitimacy taken from this angle is 
echoing with the term of recognition suggested by Kavalski (Kavalski 2006) meaning that 
to legitimate is to be recognized and vice versa.  
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To summarize discussion on opportunities and restrictions of EU diplomacy we 
should point out that majority of scholarly work has been devoted to explaining those 
through the unique nature of the EU. The most significant problem which has been widely 
identified and analyzed is the one of consistency and coherence (Gebhard, 2011). Multi-
institutional character and complexity of the EU as an entity entails challenges of vertical 
and horizontal coherence in the EU external action meaning respectively coherence between 
levels of governance and coherence between policy areas (Smith et al 2015). This is 
amplified by the fact that there is not central and highest decision maker who can set the 
priorities, distribute the resources and control for coherent line in the policy choices.  
As for the general functions performed by diplomacy, according to Hocking and 
Smith those lie in representation, communication and negotiation (Hocking and Smith, 
2011). Though the EU is a unique international actor, and its diplomacy has peculiarities, 
those functions should not be disregarded in the context of our research since they can be 
linked to exercising normative action. For instance, while making a statement on shrinking 
civic space the EU communicates a certain message, at the same time this statement is 
representing EU in the country where it has been issues. While conducting the analysis of 
the statement we will include the question of self-presenting frames from which we are going 
to draw insights specifically on the self-EU representation and how it varies depending on 
the environment in which the EU is operating.  
Overall, the European system of diplomacy has been called “diplomacy of 
different speeds” admitting that the voice of the EU towards China will be genuinely 
different from the voice of the EU towards Canada or Lesotho (Austermann 2014). The 
insight into the logic of these different speeds has been remarkably tested by looking into 
the level of centralization of European diplomacy (Austermann 2014). Importantly, the 
inquiry of current research is also inspired by expected variations in the voice of EU 
diplomacy towards third countries. Taking shrinking civic space as a theme we will map-out 
and compare normative rhetoric’s of EU delegations in countries with closed and repressed 
civic space and find out in how different the levels of repression in a third country affects 
EU normative response.  
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1.4  Shrinking civic space 
 
For the purposes of the current research we will define civic space in line with 
definition of CIVCUS monitor as containing the right for association, the right for peaceful 
assembly, the right for freedom of expression – “three fundamental rights outlining the 
boundaries within which civil society can operate” (CIVCUS 2016). The right-based 
definition is suitable for us from both conceptual and operational sides. As a concept, it 
covers the essence of civic space as a set of conditions enabling citizens to exercise their 
fundamental rights. Operationally, this definition is appropriate since it is congruent with 
our estimation of the levels of repression which will also be borrowed from methodology 
developed by CIVCUS. Namely repressions will also be operationalized as attacks on the 
right of association, the right to peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of expression. 
Thus, sticking to one definition will enable us to stay consistent and safeguard the validity 
of our findings. 
When it comes to the concept of shrinking civic space, which is empirically central 
for our research, we should mention that it has appeared quite recently to capture the trend 
of unprecedented restrictions on civil society. This means that for the moment the concept 
is not deep-rooted and well-established. In parallel with “shrinking civic space” we may find 
reference to shrinking democratic space (Ake 1999), shrinking space for defenders of human 
rights (Statement 27/02/2018), shrinking space for independent political voices (Mogerini 
2018), closing space (Carothers 2014) etc. All those variation of the concept indicate 
growing interest to the phenomena from the side of international community and scholars. 
However, this abundance of the conceptual variations may result in a chaos where nobody 
can clearly define the difference between them.  
Remarkably, one of the rare studies on conceptual problems of “shrinking civic 
space” and deconstruction of narrative on ‘shrinking space’ has pointed out on the difference 
in possible interpretations of the “space part” (Twomey 2017, p 3). The narrow and limited 
understanding of the space would be the “space to influence policy” (having space for input, 
participation in decision-making), on the other hand, the space can be understood as a space 
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to operate, to organize, to protest and to have a legitimate voice (Twomey 2017, p3). Those 
two meaning are drastically different and while the first one is completely depoliticized, the 
second one on the opposite tends to strengthen contestations. Depending on the perception 
of the space, the type of reaction on violations will look like and what will be considered as 
violation. This distinction bears important implications for those who operate in this space, 
for those who defend them and for those violate their rights.  
Current study sticks to the concept “shrinking civic space” and puts an emphasize on 
the importance of maintaining conceptual clarity. We will assume that the EU is adhering to 
broad understanding shrinking civic space which encompasses restrictive measures against 
all the important civil society actors such as civil society organizations, independent 
journalists, human rights defenders and covers all types of insults on three core civic 
freedoms. Moreover, while looking into the statements of EU delegations one of the 
questions we ask will be precisely how the shrinking space is conceptualized. We expect to 
see which concepts EU delegations apply to indicate the violations on civic freedoms, how 
the conceptualization varies between closed and repressed countries. We deem that keeping 
discourse consistent is relevant for building a consistent narrative, consequently, this study 
will explore how the EU is coping with this task.  
Even though a cross-cutting issue, shrinking civic space is most closely related to 
EU democracy and human rights promotion; we may even assume that shrinking civic space 
is incorporated into this broader theme. Historically, democracy and human rights promotion 
have gained a legal basis under Maastricht Treaty, when the EU was given de jure 
obligation to set respective normative objectives and carry out respective normative 
policies. From that moment democracy promotion “sits at the heart of the EU’s efforts to 
find an international role for itself” (Pridham 2007). However, despite voicing about the 
absolute priority for the human rights and democracy promotion, the EU is often criticized 
for taking and ambiguous approach to these policies because of other, more relevant issues 
such as economic interest, geopolitics consideration, security, etc. It holds the same 
regarding shrinking civic space, thus, we might expect that academic interest will again be 
focused on examining double-standards between rhetorical promises and real politics. Our 
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study is different in this regard since it focuses on discursive practices and strives to put into 
the spotlight the necessity to define the concepts.  
Remarkably, to this date in the EU there is no definition of democracy which could 
be considered as formal. Instead, in its official documents and foreign policy instruments the 
EU is referring to essential elements of democracy such as rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, transparency and accountability (Omelicheva 2014). Whether or not 
an official definition of democracy should be adopted is a question which is out of the scope 
of our study, what would be of interest for us is whether the EU is applying concept of 
democracy in its interactions with third countries, especially, whether it uses the concept in 
relation with countries which cannot be considered as liberal democracies. Scholarship on 
this topic is not that broad. But Jan Hornat in his article “Closing the closing space: 
sustaining democracy promotion in European foreign policy” provides quite valuable 
insight. While comparing EU and US democracy promotion he comes to the conclusion 
that in dealing with third countries EU is refraining to use the term democracy promotion 
or democracy leaning towards using more neutral “good governance” (Hornat 2016). 
The latter term is less ideologically flavored, thus according to Hornat “signifies a 
strategy of reacting to democratic backlash” (Hornat 2016). This point is crucial since it 
implicitly suggests that the choice of conceptual frames is driven not only by overall 
approach of a certain actor but also by systemic factors such as level of normative 
confrontation in a particular country as well as on the global level. This systemic factor 
cannot be disregarded. While looking into the statements of EU delegations we will pose 
a question whether the EU is incorporating the term democracy into its rhetorical 
response to shrinking civic space, whether it is applying any other term and whether this 
varies depending on the level of repression in the third country.  
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2. THEORY AND MATERIAL 
 
In this section, we will motivate the choice of social constructivism as our wider 
theoretical ground and critical discourse analyses as our theoretical and methodological tool. 
We will give a brief introduction on social constructivism illuminating its most relevant 
aspects in the context of our research. This will be followed up by presenting critical 
discourse analysis, how it has been applied to research on the EU actorness, how it suits for 
exploring normative dimension of policies and why it is the best choice of method for 
answering the questions we pose. In the third part of the section, we will elaborate on the 
choice of statements of EU delegations as a material for our study and show how we will 
tangibly contribute to the scholarship on the topic. 
 
2.1 Social constructivism 
 
Social constructivism started to be extensively applied in social science since the late 
1980s early 90s, the major contribution to this being made by Foucault, Lyotard and Derrida 
(Fierke & Jørgensen, 2001, Dias 2013). Social constructivism contends that our world is 
artificially constructed and is accessible to us mainly via different ways of categorizing it. 
Moreover, constructivists argue that social problems are related to certain ‘problem owners’ 
who impose their vision and definition of the problems on other actors (Gusfield, 1981). In 
this way social constructivism has made a substantial input into the theory of organization 
as mobilization of bias introduced by Elmer Schattsneider. Under mobilization of bias was 
meant that all forms of organizations are prone to have a bias of exploiting various conflicts 
or tensions. Constructivism has refined this theory by looking more closely into the process 
in which some concepts and definitions are ‘organized into politics while others are 
organized out’ (Schattschneider 1960) 
This aspect is particularly relevant in the context of our research since shrinking civic 
space can also be regarded as organized into politics or organized out, depending on the 
willingness and activism of certain actors to mobilize the bias. Thus, it is important to know 
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exactly how the problem is defined, which aspects are getting more attention and which are 
left out of the spotlight. Remarkably, while positivist methodologies are often criticized for 
failing to spell out the problem of representation, social constructivism is covering this gap 
by focusing on how the problems are defined and who are those “masters of definitions” 
(Hajer 1997). This is exactly what our research aims to achieve by looking into statements 
of the EU delegations in order to get an insight on the EU normative actorness. 
More to this, among different theoretical approaches, social constructivism is 
considered to be the most suitable for exploring ideational aspects of policies (Morin & 
Carta, 2014, p.30). For instance, according to Korsgaard, constructivism is perceiving 
normative concepts not as labels for facts, events and objects that we encounter but rather as 
“the names of the solutions of problems” (Korsgaard 2008). Consequently, constructivism 
provides a solid framework for research on normative concepts and normative actorness; 
moreover, it enables to look at democracy as social from (Schmidt, J 2015) which is relevant 
to keep in mind while taking shrinking civic space and EU democracy promotion as a central 
theme.  
Another important aspect that should not be overlooked is how constructivism is 
approaching the concept of identity. According to constructivism, since the interests and 
policies of the actors are formulated within certain frameworks of meanings, they are not 
perceived as exogenously given. Those preferences and choices are derived rather from 
understanding of the world and identity of those actors (Tora Christiansen 2004, Weldes 
1996). In the context of our research theme, Jurado observes that speeches from EU 
representatives imply that the EU’s approach towards human rights abroad is drawn from its 
identity as a “community of values”. This point is instrumental for our research since 
discourse of EU delegations will be investigated as closely intertwined with EU identity, the 
importance of narrating shrinking civic space problem for constructing and upholding this 
identity will be emphasized. We will go in line with scholars who believe that the internal 
stability of the EU is contingent upon the coherence of a single European – and particularly 
EU – identity (Habermas, 2006; Welle, 2013). 
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Social constructivism is in no way homogenous, it has given origin for various 
branches which spring from the same root but diverge in epistemology, sources of inspiration 
and methods they apply (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, Fierke and Jørgensen 2001). For 
instance, Checkel has defined three main variations of constructivism: conventional, 
interpretative, and critical/radical constructivism (Checkel 2007:58). Interpretative and 
critical constructivism belong to post-positivist tradition and investigate the social world in 
a way which is rather different from the conventional constructivists. Conventional 
constructivists in most of the cases explore the role of norms in the development of political 
outcomes looking into the causal link between the norms (which are taken as a given) and 
political outcomes. On the other hand, interpretative and critical constructivism are 
exploring the discursive practices which shape those norms and make them existent 
(Schwellnus 2005). 
In the current study will follow the framework provided by critical constructivism 
since it enables to establish the connections between the material and discursive reality, 
expanding beyond pure linguistics and engaging into structure-agent interactions as well as 
the whole process of systemic transformation and change (Adler & Pouliot, 2011). Critical 
constructivism presumes that agent-structure interactions and decision-making in general are 
influenced by both endogenous and exogenous factors (Andreatta, 2005, p. 31). In this 
context structures are interpreted as entities that are historical, social, and discursive, thus, 
dynamic and changeable (Copeland, 2006, p. 7). This point provides fruitful background for 
investigating the impact of structure (in our case - the level of repression in the third country) 
on the discourse derived from the statement of EU delegations on shrinking civic space. 
While preserving the interpretative approach, the focus of critical constructivism is 
less on the language as a means of persuasion as it holds for conventional constructivism, 
but more on discourses, speech acts and structures of argumentation as reflecting power, 
interests and perceptions of a certain actor (Diez 1999). Thus, critical constructivism enables 
to critically analyze the practical consequences of discursive struggles and relate it to the 
social reality which is both material and discursive.  
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2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Critical constructivism is allocating big importance to the role of language and 
discourse and leans towards applying critical discourse analysis as a methodological tool. 
By means of critical discourse analysis one can critically elaborate upon and interpret certain 
patterns of the actor’s behavior and practices (Nitoiu& Tomic 2015: 95). As pointed out by 
some scholars, critical discourse analysis provides a decent basement for investigating the 
nature of international actorness (Larsen 2004). Critical discourse analysis has been also 
extensively applied in European Integration studies. Some authors have shown how 
institutions, legislation and EU community itself are shaped by communication and 
discourse (Schmidt 2010). A separate pull of scholarship has been focusing on foreign-
policy decision-making on the EU level by means of analyzing political rhetoric’s or 
communicative action (Schimmelfennig 2001). Others focused on EU external policies, 
analyzing issues related to securitization, legitimacy, representation and identity-building 
applying poststructuralist approaches (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). The seminal 
study on investigating EU foreign policy by means of discourse analysis has been introduced 
by Caterina Carta and Jean-Frédéric Morin (Carta&Morin 2014). Our research will add to 
existing scholarship on application of discourse analysis and take full advantage of 
theoretical lenses it provides to addressing normative actorness of the EU by looking into 
statements of EU delegations on shrinking civic space. 
To maintain the conceptual clarity, first and foremost, we will define what do we 
mean by a discourse. Discourse can be widely encountered in social research as a macro 
concept focused on how the linguistic structures called also as structures of signification 
construct and constrain social reality. Language in this context can be seen as both enabling 
and constraining the choices of the actors, and even more - as generating actors and social 
processes (Tonra, B, & Christiansen, T 2004). Discourse may mean different things; thus, it 
is essential to tailor the definition of it to the purposes of a concrete research. As one of the 
researches wisely said: “the word discourse is meaningless until the scholar fills it up with a 
meaning” (Gomm 2004 246). 
24 
 
Discourse in our research will be defined along the lines with Michel Foucault as 
„limited range of possible statements promoting a limited range of meanings” (Foucault 
1989). It will be regarded as an instrument of power and domination, as a structure which 
creates oppositional and asymmetrical relations of power (Dias 2013). As Fairclough and 
Wodak claim, through discourse analysis we can study how power relations are exercised 
and negotiated in a discourse (Fairclough and Wodak 1997).  It should also be added, that 
the discourse may dwell independently from social artifacts, reflecting not mere words but 
broader ways of thinking (Philips, Hardy 2002: 3-4).  Accordingly, critical discourse 
analysis is the tool which reveals relationships of power, representations and prejudices that 
are not always explicit (Beauguitte et al 2015). 
After defining discourse as a term, it should be explained how and why CDA suits 
for meeting our research objectives. First, critical discourse analysis is particularly 
valuable for addressing EU actorness since it critically explores social structuring which is 
manifested through language and scrutinizes obvious and hidden structural relationships 
such as of power, dominance and discrimination (Rasmussen 2009, Teun A 1993). It 
provides a toolkit for investigation on how certain practices and texts are derived from the 
power relations between agents and how more fundamentally the relations between 
discourse and society look like (Fairclough 1993).  By examining the process through which 
policy meanings are transmitted, it is possible to determine not only what a particular policy 
means but how it means (Yanow 1996). Regarding normative aspect involved in our study, 
it is particularly important that critical discourse analysis seeks to show that we need a much 
more refined understanding of the interactions that construct the reality, in particular the way 
the empirical is embedded into the normative. (Fisher 2003).  
Methodologically speaking, CDA gives central role to the analysis of text and 
linguistics to show how the meanings are formed. It should be clearly distinguished from 
another widely used macro approach for analyzing discourse, namely, discourse theory. 
Discourse theory introduced by Laclau and Mouffe aims to identify and examine discourses 
more broadly without engaging into specific linguistic details (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). 
Current research will take to the details of text to derive from it certain pattern, 
methodologically strictly adhering to CDA. More detailed explanation of our analytical 
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framework will be provided in the research design section. Before that, we will motivate the 
choice of statements of EU delegations as our research material.  
 
2.3 Material for the study: Statements of EU delegations 
 
This section aims to explain what is the relevance of the statements of EU delegations 
for exploring EU normative actorness. Thus, we will first outline the role of the statements 
as a diplomatic tool, focusing mainly on the objectives of issuing a statement. In this way, 
we are going to motivate the choice of statements issued by EU delegations as a material for 
our study. Then, we will look at academic literature which illuminates EU context of 
exercising declaratory diplomacy. While covering the questions above, we will also show 
how our research will contribute to the existing scholarship on the topic.  
To start off, we should emphasize that opinions on the role of EU declaratory 
diplomacy are rather contradictory. Pessimists claim, for instance, that statements of EU 
delegations do not make a difference at all (Jørgensen 2014). According to Lehne, in many 
cases those statements are “mere empty words without the substance” issued in order to give 
the impression of being as an important actor on the international arena (Lehne 2011). Other 
authors indulge in evaluating the statements in relation with the actions on the ground stating 
that self-aggrandizing rhetoric of the EU has led to unrealistic expectations of what the it 
can achieve (Mayer 2008). Consequently, the warning comes that conceptualization of the 
EU as a normative power through discourse is so close to being exact reflections of the 
Union’s own rhetoric that it “sets the alarm bells ringing” (Sjursen 2006). 
Anyway, despite the strong criticism, the role of diplomatic statements can be viewed 
from a completely different angle. Antoine Feron is stating that declaratory diplomacy is a 
staple of contemporary diplomacy (Feron 2015). Accordingly, issuing a statement enables 
to show presence and engagement, communicate certain position and to exert political 
pressure (F. Wesslau, 2013). Declaratory diplomacy is expecting the response from its target, 
being in this aspect very different from the practice of quiet diplomacy. Importantly, as 
Kinzelbach notes, quiet diplomacy can not only be worthless but also counterproductive 
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(Kinzelbach 2015) meaning that the EU should be prepared to use its voice openly when 
democracy and human rights are being disregarded. 
After all, it is worthy to note that the process of issuing a diplomatic statement is 
driven by motives summarized in literature as a triple objective (Feron 2015). This triple 
dimension of analysis was first developed by Barber in relation to international sanctions 
(Barber 1979), and then adapted and used in the EU context by De Wilde and Feron (De 
Wilde 2004). The first objective concerns the target, meaning that sender wants to influence 
certain practices of a target of the statement or convey certain message to the target. The 
second objective implies that the EU itself becomes a target of its statement meaning that 
issuing a statement not only reflects the consensus reached by different agents of the EU 
multilevel governance but also influences certain agents of the EU as well as future practises. 
This aspect deserves particular attention in the light of our study since we will assume issuing 
a statement on shrinking civic space is in itself contribution to the construction of EU identity 
as a normative power. The third objective of issuing a statement concerns third parties or 
international community and is aiming to accumulate support on certain issue or project the 
idea of EU being normative in its external action (Feron 2015). 
Thus, the role of diplomatic statements should not be underestimated since they have 
all the potential to influence not only their target but international community and, 
interestingly enough, the sender itself. Concerning the statements related to shrinking civic 
space issues, it should be added that as an instrument of diplomatic pressure they also 
contribute to the “Western leverage” defined by Levitski as vulnerability of authoritarian 
governments to the pressure of democratization (Levitski 2005). As mentioned in the 
introduction, global struggle over meaning between different actors of the increasingly 
multipolar world will represent the backdrop of our study.  
When it comes to academic studies that focused on EU context of declaratory 
diplomacy, we should note the contribution of Regelsberger and Wessels who presented 
statistics on declarations issued in the framework of CFSP along with common strategies, 
joint actions, common positions, mission reports, documents on enhanced cooperation as 
well as other CFSP-related decisions of the Council for the period from 1970 to 2002 
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(Regelsberger and Wessels, 2004), which was subsequently updated to cover the period from 
2002 to 2005 (Bonvicini and Regelsberger, 2007).  
The next study which is to be mentioned is the one conducted by Vončina, which 
focused again on the CFSP statements and declarations in the pre-Lisbon period (Vončina 
2011). She developed typology of the CFSP statements and presented their detailed review 
for the period between 2005 and 2009. Her findings suggest that statements reflect the nature 
of the CFSP, and are primarily used to express EU reaction on certain event. Quite 
remarkably, they also prove the ability of the EU to create a single voice despite of all 
complications of decision-making (Vončina 2011). 
The last study to mention belongs to Antoine Feron and is targeting post-Lisbon 
declaratory diplomacy of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (Feron 2015). In the end, he provides quantitative assessment of statements 
based on geography and theme taking as a basis the analytical framework developed by 
Vončina (Vončina 2011).  
To summarize, we would provide some critical observations with regards to the 
existing literature. First of all, we should point out that being driven mainly by empirical 
data, they lack in theoretical underpinning, as well as motivations for the methodology. 
Another critical comment may be directed to the fact that current literature is providing 
rather descriptive explanation of the EU diplomacy using quantitative analysis of the 
statements. Lastly, scholars set the ambition to explore actorness (Vončina 2011) concluding 
that diplomacy indeed reflects it, however, they never show how it happens and why it is so.  
Our research will complement the existing literature by focusing on one theme in 
depth and using the empirical material such as statements of EU delegations to investigate 
theoretically strong and complicated concept of EU normative actorness. Application of 
critical discourse analysis will enable us to go deeper into the content of the statement then 
the previous studies did. On the other hand, elements of quantification will help out in doing 
exhaustive mapping and identifying patterns. Our study is inspired by a desire to test causal 
link between systemic factors (such as level of oppression on civic space) and capabilities 
of the EU to use its diplomatic rhetoric’s. We will use the empirical data in a completely 
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new way aiming to identify patents and variations in the EU discourse on shrinking civic 
space depending on the level of oppression in the third country.  
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The aim of our study is to identify patents and variations in the EU discourse on 
shrinking civic space depending on the level of oppression in the third country. More 
crucially we have an ambition to explore how systemic factors (such as level of oppression 
on civic space) shape the capability and presence of the EU to project its normative actorness 
through the discourse. Thus, research design and methods should be selected accordingly. 
We will start off by explaining how we operationalize actorness and the levels of repression, 
then we will provide explanation for the selection of empirical data, we will proceed by 
presenting methodology which is tailored to meeting our research objectives. Lastly, we will 
outline our framework for analysis of the statements and mention what limitations our study 
holds. 
 
4.1 Operationalization of actorness 
 
To opertionalize EU actorness we will use the framework developed by Bretherton 
and Vogler consisting of such elements as presense, opportunity and capability 
(Bretherton &Vogler 1999). The opportunity is considered to represent a systemic factor – 
in our case – level of repression on civic space, presence will be seen as presence by means 
of a discourse and capability – as capability to generate discourse in a certain way. Our 
study will aim to show how opportunity may influence the presence and capability of a 
normative actor. We expect that depending on the level of opression the communication of 
EU delegations on shrinking space issues will vary. This variation will be in the focus of 
our analysis. The way we derive insight on capability and presence will be explained while 
presenting our analytical framework. Now, we would like to explain how we categorize 
countries by levels of oppression. 
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The level of oppression is the axis where are expecting to observe the variation. It 
basically represents the state or the currents condition for the civic space. We won’t develop 
our own indicators for such categorization and will borrow it from existing research platform 
called CIVICUS Monitor. 
CIVICUS Monitor is aiming to spread and share reliable, up-to-date information on 
the state of civic rights and freedoms all over the world. CIVICUS methodology combines 
several independent sources of data, and conducts its ratings and analysis based on multiple 
qualitative and quantitate sources (Civicus Monitor. Methodology). CIVICUS Monitor is 
presenting itself as a research tool and by current study we will fully benefit from it by 
applying its mapping of the countries categorized by the level of repression on civic space.  
As for the categories of countries by levels of repression which we are going to take 
into analysis, those would be – countries where space for civic freedom is 1) closed, 2) 
repressed. We have chosen those categories based on the assumption that the biggest amount 
of violations is occurring exactly on these ladders.  
“Closed space” according to CIVICUS means that civic space is completely shut - 
both by law and in practice. Anyone who dares to criticize the authorities will risk severe 
punishment which results in the spreading of fear and violence. State is allowed to harass 
those who attempt to exercise their three core rights – right for peaceful assembly, 
association and freedom of expression. Media freedom is non-existent and online activism 
leads to penalties (Civicus Monitor. Methodology). 
“Repressed space” means that possibilities for civil society to operate are severely 
constrained. Criticism of those at power often leads to harassment, surveillance, 
imprisonment, in particular cases even to injury and death. Civil society organization are 
operating in constant fear of either being closed or de-registered. Media are very much 
connected to state power and reflect their opinion; independent media are attacked by raiders 
or face legal harassment. Activism through the internet is steadily monitored (Civicus 
Monitor. Methodology). 
Thus, by means of the current research we will test how capabilities of the normative 
actor vary depending on systemic factors. We deliberately did not choose the third category 
– obstructed countries (such as Ukraine, India, Indonesia) to limit the scope of our study. 
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However, sadly enough, not only authoritarian countries show the tendency to insult civil 
society, this increasingly happens even inside western world deserves prioritized attention 
from scholars and policy-makers.   
 
4.2 Selection of material 
 
More is to be said regarding our material, from which the insights on EU normative 
actorness will be derived. The motivation for using statements has been explicitly provided 
in our previous section. However, we would love to provide some information on the 
selection of the material. To ensure a systematic and non-biased analysis we have collected 
all the statements of the EU delegations on “shrinking civic space” in closed and repressed 
countries in the period Jan 2015- Dec 2017. The suggested time span was deemed to be the 
most sensible since it enables to get an exhaustive picture of the EU discourse and its 
variation depending on the level of oppression. Moreover, last couple of years the 
repressions on civic space were claimed to be peaking and the problem of shrinking space 
appeared acutely on the agenda of international community and actors pursuing normative 
agenda. 
Altogether we have collected and assessed 90 statements related to shrinking space 
in countries where civic space is considered to be repressed or closed. Every statement can 
be regarded as a case since it has been approached both quantitatively and qualitatively, on 
the other hand, it is the normative actorness of the EU which our research enquiry more 
fundamentally is focused on, thus, those many cases may be regarded as many cases inside 
a single case - the EU.  
 
4.3. Methodology  
 
Methodologically, our study relies on both qualitative and quantitative tools. 
Quantitative approach represented by the elements of content analysis enables to measure 
specific aspects of capability and presence of the normative actor and to test our causal 
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inference. Content analysis assumes a consistency of meaning thus will allow us to count 
those this which can be counted (Hardy et al 2004).  Overall, we deem quantification to be 
well suited for performing exhaustive mapping and identify patterns in the discourse 
produced by EU delegations. 
On the other hand, by means of qualitative assessment represented by critical 
discourse analysis we are going to get deeper understanding on how the meanings are 
produced and transmitted, namely, how discourse of the EU delegations varies by different 
qualitative indicators depending on the level of repression. Discourse analysis is particularly 
valuable in this context since it highlights the “precarious nature of meaning with focus on 
explaining its shifting and contested nature” (Hardy et al 2004). 
As King and Keohane pointed out in their seminal study, patterns and trends are more 
readily subjected for quantitative assessment, but to understand the rapidly changing social 
world, we will need to include information that cannot be easily quantified as well as that 
which can (King et al 1994). This statement provides an excellent motivation for our choice 
of methods since it advocates for a research design which would combine elements and 
features of both qualitative and quantitative traditions.  
Comparative approach is the next essential element of our study which requires 
explanation. Our research question is aiming to address the variation in the discourse of EU 
delegations depending on the level of repression meaning that comparison lies at the very 
heart of it. Comparison is a necessary element for conducting a study in social science and 
it is the comparisons which make a study scientific. By means of comparisons we can control 
whether generalizations hold across cases which they apply. As contended by Sartori: 
comparative knowledge provides the key to understanding, explaining and interpreting 
(Sartori 1991). 
 
4.5. Framework for analysis.  
 
To address our enquiry, we have developed a framework which enables us to 
quantitatively as well as qualitatively approach the stamens of EU delegations. Importantly, 
32 
 
this framework also represents the way we operationalize the capability and presence of the 
EU to exercise its normative actorness. In our research we will make a structured comparison 
between the EU statements issued in the countries with repressed and closed space 
respectively. We will be collecting the data on the same variables across all the statements 
by applying a standardized set of questions that reflect the goal of the study and its theoretical 
focus (King et al 1994) 
Our framework will be based on the following questions:  
• Overall number and geography of statements  
• Type of statement (generic/issue-specific),  
• Conceptualization of shrinking space,  
• Linkages to democracy, 
• Linkage to cooperation with EU,  
• Linkage to international, regional, national norms and standards, 
• Self-portrayal of the EU.  
Each question is expected to provide us with quite specific and valuable insights on 
how normative capabilities and presence of the EU reflected in a discourse vary depending 
on the level of repression. For instance, overall number and geography of the statements 
would allow to measure normative presence of the EU in a particular setting. Analysis of the 
types of statements (generic or issue specific) will give us understanding of what types of 
issues dominate EU discourse – individual or systematic and how this varies depending on 
the level of repressions. Conceptualization of shrinking space is our next relevant question. 
Here we will be interested to see how shrinking space is conceptualized in a discourse of EU 
delegations, what rights are referred to the most and whether this conceptualization varies. 
Next variable – linkage to democracy is quite central for our research since it enables us to 
test whether EU has space to promote the alternative type of governance in deeply rooted 
authoritarian countries and hybrid regimes. The next question concerns linkages to 
international, regional, national norms and standards, and depicts what norms EU is referring 
to the most and which types of norms are being prioritized. Lastly, self-portrayal of the EU 
in the statements would give us an insight on whether EU is incorporating its own normative 
image into discourse, as well as whether the EU is using supportive frames or references to 
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the prospects of cooperation while addressing the countries where space for civic freedoms 
is closed or repressed.  
 
Limitations.  
While looking into the level of repression as on independent variable, we admit that 
there may be plenty of other factors behind the variation that we expect to observe in the 
discourse of EU delegations. This might be, for instance, strategic importance, previous 
history of relations, socio-political context of the third country, interests of the EU member 
states, trade-relations, different dynamics of repression, existence of other channels for 
excreting diplomatic pressure and promoting democracy and human rights. Being aware of 
all those possible explanations this research won’t aim to test them. The only causal link we 
will focus on is – the one between the level of repression and the expected variation in the 
discourse of EU delegation related to shrinking civic space.  
 
4. Analysis 
 
4.1 Part I: Repressed Space 
General observations (quantity/geography):  
The total number of statements issued by EU delegations in countries with repressed 
civic space amounts at 78. Out of 26 countries defined as repressed by CIVICUS Monitor 
statements related to civic space were released by EU delegations in 14 countries. 
Considering geography of the statements we can observe that the largest amount of statement 
has been issued in countries which are close to EU geographically, namely, Russia (18) 
Azerbaijan (17), Egypt (9) and Belarus (5). 
Remarkably, Turkey stands out as an outliner addressed with only 2 statements 
despite being a close neighbor of the EU and having tight relations with the EU. This case 
can be used for supporting our hypothesis that systemic factor such as level of restriction in 
the country can be considered as a factor accounting for the EU being less prone to use 
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declaratory diplomacy. And even though Turkey is considered to be repressed country by 
CIVICUS categorization and not as closed, the recent developments indicate that the space 
for pluralism and democracy has been shrinking quite substantially in the country in the 
recent years (Freedom House 2017). Thus, silence of the EU in this case indicated that space 
for the EU voice is getting closed as well.  
As for the other regions, the distribution of the statements is the following: South-
East Asia (13), Central Asia (4), Central Africa (6) and Latin America (4).  
Type of statements 
The most obvious trend regarding the type of statements is that issue-specific 
statements substantially outweigh generic statements: while we found 65 issue-specific 
statements, generic accounted only for 13. Analysis of the statements has shown that generic 
statements cover such topics as situation with media, freedom and expression (Afghanistan, 
Uganda), civil society (Egypt), restrictions of the political space (Cambodia), general 
developments (Azerbaijan), etc. We won’t aim to explain the reluctance of the EU to using 
generic statements in its declaratory diplomacy, however, we should point out that this might 
be a convenient instrument enabling to focus on certain problems without the need for a 
trigger. Theoretically, using more generic statements may contribute to building more 
systematic approach to voicing problematic aspects of human rights and democracy and add 
more continuity into respective policies.  
As for the issue-specific statements, it is important to point out that most of them 
were related to cases of arrest, detention or sentencing (28), followed by the statements on 
the release (13). The cases of murder or abduction of HRDs, journalists and lawyers account 
for 10 statements which is approximately the same number as was issued to indicate 
restrictive legislation (8). The rest of 6 issue-specific statements were triggered by different 
types of events starting from freeze the assets of HRDs in Egypt (Statement 17/09/2016) and 
finishing with the shutdown of Amnesty International Office in Russia (Statement 
03/11/2016).  
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Conceptualization of shrinking space: 
The direct conceptualization of shrinking space implies mentioning the concept itself 
or related expressions, which, as our analysis have shown, are quite rare in the rhetoric’s of 
the EU delegations. To be precise, the notion of restrictions on “space for civil society” was 
used two times along with “restriction of democratic space” once, political space – two 
times, “space for freedom and human rights defenders” once and “space for debate and 
discussion” once. Against the backprop of EU increasingly using this concept in its policy 
documents, internal rhetoric and in the UN, it is quite remarkable that the conceptualization 
of shrinking civic space has not been established in the declaratory diplomacy of EU 
delegations. This is mostly a matter of coherence and consistency of the discourse as well as 
having the opportunity to increase the scope of the issues that are problematized. 
On the other hand, we should not disregard linkage to specific rights which stand 
behind the concept of shrinking civic space, namely freedom of speech, assembly and 
association. In this line, EU delegations were way more active. Namely, out of 75 linkages 
to shrinking civic space, almost half were devoted to freedom of expression (33 times), as 
well as to it freedom of media (10 times), and freedom of speech (4 times). Freedom of 
association and assembly have been referred to only 8 times in total. Thus, rhetorical 
reaction of EU delegations on shrinking civic space is mainly focused on the freedom 
of expression. We won’t aim to find the reason behind it in the current study, however, we 
should note that the possible cause of this might lie in the increased scope of violations of 
this fundamental right particularly. It can also be viewed through the lenses of increasingly 
contested normative agendas where restrictions on freedom of speech symbolize a fight for 
survival on the side of authoritarian states.  
Linkage to democracy: 
Our study is based on the assumption that in increasingly multipolar world the most 
serious contestation is related to the topic of what should be considered as normal. To put it 
roughly, - the battle between liberal and authoritarian world-view. The concept of democracy 
has an essential place in the whole debate, and so called “Western world” is struggling hard 
to promote democratic values linking them to stability, well-being, and most importantly, - 
to fundamental rights.  
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In our material, we have defined 35 linkages to democracy. Thus, the EU does use 
this type of linkage in its rhetoric’s on issues related to shrinking space, however, here we 
expect to see the significant variation with countries where the space for civic freedoms is 
closed. This will be investigated in more detail in the following section.  
Remarkably, Egypt and Belarus have gathered the biggest amount of statements 
referring to democracy, respectively, 7 and 5 linkages. The examples of those linkages are 
the following: “Civil society plays a key role for open and democratic societies” (Egypt) 
(Statement 24/03/2016) or “The latest developments in Belarus highlight a clear need for a 
broader democratization process in the country” (Belarus) (Statement 17/03/2017). Again, 
we see the pattern of EU being more open and vocal with its normative agenda when it comes 
to the countries of its neighborhood. The country that stands out in our examination in this 
context is Russia. EU delegation to Russia has issued the largest amount of statements in 
comparison to all the other countries, covering the whole spectrum of shrinking space issues, 
starting from restrictive legislation and finishing with banning the activities of a religious 
group. But despite this variety of issues along with active rhetoric’s from EU delegations, 
the linkage to democracy was used only once with regards to Russia. The respective 
statement follows: “Attacks on journalists and human rights defenders …pose a particular 
threat to democracy” (Statement 15/07/2017). This example is quite puzzling and finding 
out the answer might require a separate research. We will conclude, however, that 
declaratory diplomacy of the EU towards Russia is affected by increasingly revisionist 
agenda of Russia. Thus, the leeway for promoting democratic values openly gets restricted. 
Linkage to cooperation: 
Another important tool of declaratory diplomacy lies in using linkages to the 
prospects of cooperation which can be labeled as soft conditionality. In the statements of EU 
delegations on shrinking civic space we have identified 13 instances where links to 
cooperation have been used. Not surprisingly, geographical and geopolitical factors again 
come as explanatory for the observed variation: Belarus (4 times), Azerbaijan (4 times) and 
Egypt (3 times) stand for almost all the cooperative linkages which had been applied by the 
EU. Noteworthy, all those countries are part of neighborhood policy with its focus on 
promotion of human right and democracy. To provide a textual example for a classic 
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cooperative linkage, here comes the one from the statement of EU delegation in Belarus: 
“The importance of releasing all political prisoners remains crucial in the context of 
improving EU-Belarus relations” (Statement 06/05/2015). Here, the decision with regards 
to political prisoners is directly linked to prospective of cooperation. Another, even bolder 
way of using cooperative linkage can be observed on the example of a statement of the EU 
delegation in Egypt. The statement was expressing the concern of introducing anti-NGO law 
and stated that “Some provisions, such as the ones related to the registration process, the 
activities NGOs are allowed to perform and the procedure for receiving domestic and foreign 
funding, are also likely to directly affect European cooperation assistance to Egypt” 
(Statement 31/05/2017). These two types of linkages represent different incentives – positive 
in the first case, and negative in the second, meaning that both of them are successfully 
applied by diplomatic rhetoric’s of the EU. Though, currently, mainly in relation to the 
neighbouring countries.  
Linkage to norms (international, regional, national constitution) 
Linkage to international, national or regional norms and standards gives a solid 
support in a seminal discussion on what is to be perceived as normal. And as our findings 
suggest, those linkages are extensively used by EU delegations in the statements they release. 
For instance, in the present corpus of material we managed to find 54 instances of using 
these types of linkages. Most of them (32) were referring to international commitments. 
National norms such as Constitution are mentioned less frequently – 17 times to be precise. 
The rarest is the linkage applied to regional norms, such as those found in statements on 
Angola and Turkey. In the case of Angola statement referred to regional human rights 
instruments in general (Statement 14/09/2015), while in the case of Turkey – the linkage 
was provided for the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (Statement 07/08/2017). Quite exceptionally here stands 
statement issued by EU delegation to Afghanistan, - it is the only statement that referred to 
commitments agreed upon before EU and Afghanistan in EU-Afghanistan Human Rights 
Meeting (Statement 02/11/2017).  
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Self- Portrayal of the EU: 
The analysis of the statements showed that in some cases EU includes into the 
statements the elements of self-promotion presenting its deep commitment to certain rights 
and freedoms. Those cases are extremely rare, but they do occur and they deserve attention 
since even though regarded as weak instruments in relation to repressive governments, those 
affirmations play an important role in building up identity of the EU as a normative actor. 
As an example, we can provide excerpt from the statement released by EU delegation in 
Russia on the occasion of 10-year anniversary from death of famous Russian journalist and 
human rights defender Anna Politkovskaya. The statement holds as following: “The EU will 
always stand up for and support freedom of expression, in Russia and around the world 
(Statement 07/10/2016). Apart from being illustrative in relation to self-promoting frames, 
this statement also reflects the trend of placing freedom of speech at the core of discussion 
on shrinking civic space.  
While self-portraying frames are very rare, the other way to depict EU’s role and 
credibility as a normative actor lies in the usage of supportive frames. Those frames represent 
the readiness of the EU to help out and to assist in implementation of reforms or better 
practices related to democracy and human rights. Taking up those commitments by the 
means of language gives power to spin discourse in a very favorable for EU direction and 
contribute to identity-building. In the corpus of material, we have analyzed, 7 supportive 
frames have been identified which respectively were used in relation to Myanmar (1), 
Mexico (2), Belarus (1), Uganda (1), Angola (1) and Afghanistan (1). In this context, also 
important to illustrate which wordings EU is using for that. So, the most common ones are: 
“EU stands ready to support…”, “EU will continue to use all means at its disposal to 
guarantee….”, “EU remains committed to support”, “EU reiterates its continued support 
for…”. 
Thus, we can assume that supportive frames portray EU as normative actor which 
can not only demand certain standards from the third parties but also assist in their 
development and implementation. The role of those frames is also invaluable for identity 
building. 
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4.2 Part II: Closed Space 
 
General observations (quantity/georgaphy):  
With regards to countries where space for civic freedoms is defined as closed, 
statements of EU delegations were found in 3 countries (China, Vietnam and Uzbekistan) 
out of 16. 
The total number of statements is 12, and they are distributed almost equally between 
Vietnam and China, Uzbekistan accounting for only one statement on release of a political 
prisoner Samandar Kukanov (Statement 30/11/2016). Given, that the analysis of statements 
is covering a period from 2015 to 2017, we can conclude that the voice of the EU on the 
issues of shrinking space in closed countries has been extremely modest. Importantly, it has 
been way more modest while comparing with the voice of EU delegations in countries with 
repressed space.  
The factor of geographical proximity to EU is not relevant to take into estimation 
since there are no countries with closed space which are located in the EU neighborhood. 
The only observation that holds here geography-wise is that EU issued some statement 
South-East Asia while in Middle East, Centarl Asia and Africa it preserved absolute silence 
despise serious violations of civic rights and freedoms.  
Types of statements 
Remarkably, the identified statements are targeting mostly individual cases the only 
exception being a statement issued by EU delegation in China “On recent developments in 
the human rights situation” and concerning systematic arrest of a number of human rights 
lawyers and human rights defenders by Chinese public security forces (Statement 
15/07/2015). This falls into the general trend of EU using statements as a reaction on certain 
restrictions rather than commenting on the situation in general even if the level of restrictions 
is extreme.  
As for issues which have evoked EU to release a statement, the majority relates either 
to conviction/sentencing (5) or to arrest (3). There is also one statement on the release of a 
political prisoner (Uzbekistan).  
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Conceptualization of shrinking space: 
Freedom of opinion and expression is a dominant theme in the statements of EU 
delegations in closed countries. Reference to these freedoms is found in 7 statements. There 
has been also one reference to freedom of assembly in China and an instance of using 
reference to political space in the statement on Uzbekistan. Overall, majority of statements 
is extending “the scope of the problem” by linking individual cases to bigger societal issues, 
namely depicting that certain fundamental rights have been violated. However, the concept 
of shrinking space has never been used in this batch of statements, neither did frames of 
“blaming the government” for treating civil society in a wrong way.  
 
Linkage to democracy: 
Here comes the finding that essentially supports our hypothesis – word “democracy” 
has not been used a single time with regards to countries where space for civic freedoms is 
closed. This serves as a proof to the idea that since in the counties with closed space there is 
no debate on alternative type of governance, the opportunity for the EU to express its voice 
also is shrinking. Thus, EU is also facing a barrier when it comes to promoting its normative 
agenda openly. Issuing a statement is always a political decision and EU as it turned out 
obviously abstains from using the “democracy linkage” in the countries with deeply rooted 
authoritarian rule. 
Linkage to cooperation: 
Then, analysis of the EU statements in the closed countries shows that, that EU does 
not link openly prospects of cooperation to the progress in enabling civic space. The only 
exception is Uzbekistan where EU did use this diplomatic trick stating that “the release of 
Mr Samandar Kukanov sends an encouraging political message for the overall political space 
in Uzbekistan, as well as for the further strengthening of our bilateral relations” (Statement 
30/11/2016). This in no way implies that EU does not use other types of conditionality with 
regards to countries where the space for civil society is closed, but rather points out that EU 
delegations in general does not spin positive conditionality into their rhetoric’s. 
Linkage to norms (international, regional, national constitution) 
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The linkage to legal norms was used in abundance (20 times) referring either to the 
norms enshrined by national Constitutional or International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The linkage to constitution was used 8 
times which accounts for most of the statements. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
has been mentioned 4 times and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – 6 
times. There were also 2 instances where the general linkage to international human rights 
commitments has been used. These types of linkages often show us what EU expects to be 
a priority for the targeted country, unsurprisingly reference to constitutional norms being 
used the most. As for international norms, reference to “International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights” seems to contribute more specifically to the overall depicted instances of 
shrinking space to civil society. Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents very 
basic global standards, but cannot in our opinion replace the value of mentioning 
“International Covenant”. Linkage to international commitments in general is the most 
abstract one, and when without specification does not seem to be at all a strong argument.  
Portrayal of the EU: 
It is worthy to point out that EU did not present its normative nature very actively in 
the statements we analyzed. There was only one instance found in the statement released in 
Vietnam. It holds: “Support for human rights defenders is a long-established element of the 
European Union's human rights external relations policy” (Message by Ambassador 
11/10/2016). This comes as a very open normative self-image, but considering that this 
frame was used only once, we perceive it to be rather an exception. 
 
Findings 
By conducting this study, we have mapped out the discourse of EU delegations on 
shrinking civic space issues. We have compared EU discourse in countries where civic space 
is repressed and closed to test whether there is variation and how this variation looks like. 
More fundamentally, we have examined in what way systemic factors (level of repression) 
shape the capability and presence of the normative actor in a particular environment. 
European system of diplomacy indeed has been called a “diplomacy of different speeds” 
(Austermann 2014) but how these different speeds are reflected in a discourse and what role 
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do the systemic factors play out, has been always left out of the spotlight. Now, we are ready 
to present the main findings.  
Overall, during 2015-2017 the EU delegations have issued 90 statements related to 
shrinking civic space in countries categorized as closed or repressed by CIVCUS monitor. 
Remarkably, 87% of statements were issued in the countries with repressed civic space and 
only 13% - in the countries where the space for civic freedoms is closed. This observation 
supports our central claim that the EU is not getting more vocal while the level of 
repression is getting more severe. On the contrary, the EU gets silent, which means that 
normative presence of the EU as well as capability to act normatively in closed countries is 
severely limited.  
Regarding geography of the statements, we have observed that the largest amount 
of statement has been issued in countries which are close to EU geographically, namely, 
Russia, Azerbaijan, Egypt and Belarus. All of those - countries with repressed civic space. 
Thus, we can presume that geography does play its part in EU exercising its normative power 
which entails that in neighboring countries the EU is more present, more active and has more 
leverage to influence the situation with violations of civic freedoms.  As for other regions, 
we should point out that in South East Asia the EU has issued more statements than in Africa, 
Latin America, Middle East or Central Asia. This observation might require a separate study 
since indicates on the increased normative presence of the EU there.  
While looking into the type of statements, we have marked that issue-specific 
statements substantially outweigh generic statements in both repressed and closed 
environments. This indicates that EU delegations are pursuing reactive approach to 
violations of civic freedoms in third countries. Statements are issued as a reaction to a 
particular situation. Individual cases dominate structural problems. It should be emphasized, 
however, that generic statements might be considered as a convenient instrument to remind 
about problems without the need for a trigger. Using more generic statements may contribute 
to building discourse in a more systematic way. It seems to be crucial to hold the pressure 
constantly with new statements drawing linkages to the former cases. In this way, the 
narratives are being build, which enables a normative actor to be consistent in its rhetoric’s 
and sufficiently strengthen its normative presence.  
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With regards to conceptualization of shrinking civic space, the analysis of 
statements has shown that EU delegations are very seldom referring to the concept of 
shrinking civic space. To be precise, the concept has been used only two times in its original 
formulation, and a few more times in other formulations. In the meanwhile, EU is 
increasingly often using the concept of shrinking civic space in its policy documents, internal 
rhetoric’s, multilateral fora. This creates a mismatch where the concept of shrinking civic 
space has not yet been established in the rhetoric’s of the EU delegations. In the meanwhile, 
delegations use reference to specific rights such as freedom of expression, assembly and 
association. Importantly, statements referring to freedom of expression (including such 
variations of it as freedom of media and freedom of speech) have been the most frequent in 
both repressed and closed countries. Increased restrictions on freedom of speech symbolize 
a fight for survival on the side of authoritarian states, thus, involvement of the EU into debate 
and supporting the rights to express oneself freely bears strategic importance for the actor, 
which is positioning itself as a normative.  
The following finding concerns the linkage to democracy incorporated into the 
statements of EU delegations. This one is quite central for our study since it enables to 
understand whether the level of repression conditions the capability of the EU to present and 
promote democratic values openly. Quite remarkably, we have got confirmation of our claim 
that opportunity structure sets restrictions on the normative actor to promote its agenda. The 
analysis of the statements has shown that word democracy has not used not a single time in 
the countries where the civic space is closed. In countries with repressed civic space, 
reference to democracy has been applied 35 times. This means that in repressed countries 
there is still room for the EU input into the debate on what is to be considered as normal. 
Issuing a statement is always a political decision and our study shows that the EU abstains 
from using the “democracy linkage” in the countries with deeply rooted authoritarian rule. 
One may argue that keeping profile low may increase the operating space for the and enable 
to quietly promote its democratic agenda (Hornat 2016). We won’t argue that being quiet 
may have strategic reasoning behind it but at the same time we stay convinced that level of 
oppression does set the limits for the normative actorness to be manifested openly.  
The statements of EU delegations diverge between closed and repressed countries 
not only regarding the usage of the word democracy. Variation as for reference to 
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international, national or regional norms and standards is also quite remarkable. For 
instance, in repressive countries in more than the half of the instances the EU has been 
referring to international commitments. At the same time, in closed countries reference to 
national norms such as Constitution has been prevalent. This shows us how the EU is 
adjusting its statements to the perceived priorities of the targeted countries, and it is thus not 
surprising that in closed countries reference to constitutional norms has been used the most.  
This leads to a conclusion that the EU delegations tailor statements to the local context, and 
this local context thus shapes the form and intensity of the EU normative action. 
Last question we addressed in our analysis is self-portrayal of the EU in the 
statements. It appeared that the EU is extremely seldom presenting itself as a normative actor 
and it holds true for both repressed and closed countries. Instead, the EU is incorporating 
linkage to cooperation or supportive frames. Supportive frames portray the EU as an 
actor, which not only demands certain standards from the third parties, but is also ready to 
assist in their development and implementation. Supportive frames were mainly applied in 
the countries with repressed civic space and located beyond EU neighborhood. On the other 
hand, linkage to cooperation was mainly used in the countries of the EU proximity. 
Remarkably, in the countries with closed space neither supportive nor cooperative linkages 
were applied. This indicates to the fact that EU does not dare to step in openly as a supporter 
of the positive transformation, and space for this type of behavior in closed countries is 
closed.  
To sum it all, we should outline the avenue for future research and possibilities for 
generalizations. Our study was focusing on the normative actorness of the EU, mapping the 
discouse of the EU delegations on shrinking civic space in third countries. Despite we 
considered the EU as a sui generis entity, we believe that our research provides relevant 
buiding blocks not only for deeper exploration of the EU as a normative power, but 
normative actorness as such. Moreover, it has a potential to inspire further research on the 
role of systemic factors in manifestation of normative actorness and draw attention to the 
struggle on the global level on what is to be considered as normal.  
Thus, one of the ways to go further would be to compare the discourses on shrinking 
civic space of different actors pursuing normative agenda possibly even using the same 
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analytcical framework as developed in a current study.  When it comes to drawing more 
insights on the EU, it would be interesting to make structured comparisons between pairs of 
countries where EU rhetorical response has been very low and very high despite roughly the 
same level of repression. Current research provides the material which makes it easy to 
identify relevant pairs. Last but not least, it might be relevant to look into the discourse 
generated by the authoritarian states and hybrid regimes to investigate and compare what 
normes are being projected through their discourses and in what way.  
For such authors who stress on the necessity “to take the actorness beyound the EU” 
(Niemann and Bretherton 2013, Hulse 2014; Wunderlich 2012) the way to go further might 
lie in comparing the discourses on shrinking civic space produces by different normative 
actors. The analytical framework developed by the current study might serve as a good 
platform for this. For those who view EU focus as unproblematic and want to go deeper into 
exploration of the EU normative actorness (Cmakalova and Rolenc 2012), it might be of 
interest to make structured comparisons between pairs of countries where EU rhetorical 
response has been very low and very high despite roughly the same level of repression. 
Current research provides the material which makes it easy to identify relevant pairs. Last 
but not least, it might be relevant to look into the discourse generated by the authoritarian 
states and hybrid regimes to investigate and compare what normes are being projected 
through their discourses and in what way. 
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Country  Number of 
statements  
Generic 
statements  
(number and 
type) 
Issue- specific 
statements 
(number and 
trigger) 
Conceptualization 
of shrinking space  
 
 
 
Linkages to democracy Linkage to cooperation with 
EU 
Linkage to international, 
regional, national norms and 
standards 
Cambodia 8 3 
 
Statement by 
Spokesperso
n on the 
restriction of 
the political 
space (1) 
 
Local 
Statement 
on the 
political 
situation (1) 
 
Local 
statement on 
development
s relating to 
(1) 
 
5 
 
Arrest (1) 
 
closure of 
Cambodia Daily (1) 
 
release of 5 HRDs 
(1) 
 
continued 
detention 5 of 
HRDs (1) 
 
restrictive 
legislation (1) 
4 
 
freedom of 
association and 
expression (1) 
 
restrictions of 
democratic space 
(1) 
 
political space (2) 
4 
 
Ex: A free media is an 
important underpinning of 
pluralist democracy, and open 
discussion is the best support 
for effective policy-making. 
 
1 
 
“Development cooperation 
between the EU and 
Cambodia relies mainly on 
NGOs” (1) 
 
3 
 
Constitution (1) 
 
International agreements to 
which Cambodia is a signatory 
(1) 
 
Cambodian law (1) 
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Myanmar 4 1 
 
Local 
Statement in 
Support of 
Freedom of 
Media (1) 
3 
 
Arrest of 
journalists (1) 
 
Release of student 
protestors (1) 
 
Release of political 
prisoners (1) 
 
5 
Freedom of the 
press and media 
(3) 
freedom of opinion 
and expression (1) 
free and enabling 
environment for 
journalists (1) 
 
4 
Freedom of the press and 
media is the foundation and a 
cornerstone of any democracy. 
The right to freedom of opinion 
and expression is a human right 
guaranteed to all, and it 
constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of a democratic 
society 
Media freedom, independence 
and pluralism are at the heart 
of any democracy 
These decisions constitute 
noteworthy further steps in the 
country's historic transition to 
democracy. 
- 
 
-  
 
Banglades
h  
 
 
1 - 
 
1 
 
Murder of the 
bloggers 
2 
 
Free speech and 
democracy (1) 
 
Freedom of 
expression (1) 
2 
 
Tolerance and dialogue are 
essential elements of a 
democratic society 
 
The killings of Washiqur 
Rahman and Avijit Roy are an 
attack on free speech and 
democracy. 
- - 
 
Tajikistan  1 - 1 - -  1 
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Imprisonment of 
human rights 
lawyer 
 
…which is not in line with 
Tajikistan’s obligations under 
international law. 
Afghanista
n 
3 3 
 
Impunity to 
crimes 
against 
journalists 
(2) 
 
Media 
freedom (1) 
- 9 
 
Freedom of (press 
and) expression (5) 
 
freedom of the 
media (2) 
 
Freedom of speech 
(1) 
 
people's liberty of 
expression (1) 
2 
 
Freedom of expression is a 
fundamental right of the 
Afghan people and a 
cornerstone of democracy 
- 2 
 
The EU also expects the Afghan 
government to deliver on its 
commitments as agreed in the 
3rd EU-Afghanistan Human 
Rights Meeting held on 14 
August 2017 
 
Angola  1 -  1 
 
Imprisonment 
2 
 
freedom of 
assembly (1)  
 
freedom of 
expression (1) 
- 
 
- 3 
 
Constitution (1) 
 
International conventions (1) 
 
regional human rights 
instruments (1) 
 
… are all enshrined in Angola's 
Constitution and international 
conventions as well as regional 
human rights instruments the 
country adhered to. 
Uganda 2 2 
 
Statement 
on Freedom 
of Expression 
 
- 
 
3 
 
fundamental 
freedoms of 
expression and 
assembly (1), 
3 
… the democratic process in 
Uganda (1) …taking into police 
custody of opposition leader 
Mr Kizza Besigye several times 
- 1 
 
Constitution (1) 
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Statement 
on the 
Presidential 
and 
Parliamentar
y elections 
 
 
right of all citizens 
to fully express 
their civil and 
political rights (1) 
 
restriction on 
citizens' 
communication (1) 
 
is contrary to basic democratic 
principles (1) 
 … support all efforts to foster 
effective and open democratic 
governance. 
 
Zimbabve 3 1 
 
Local 
statement on 
the 
abduction of 
social 
activists 
2 
 
Abduction of HRD 
(2), 
2 
 
freedom of 
assembly and 
association (1) 
 
freedom to 
demonstrate and 
petition (1). 
1 
 
1 
Ex: 
Human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law are 
essential elements of the 
bilateral relations between 
the European Union and 
Zimbabwe 
 
2  
Constitution (2) 
The Heads of Mission note with 
growing concern a significant 
and worrying increase in the 
number of incidents over 
recent months, in violation of 
the fundamental human rights 
and freedoms enshrined in 
Chapter 4 of the Constitution. 
To express opinion in a non-
violent way is a constitutional 
right for all Zimbabwean 
citizens, including for Mr 
Dzamara 
Belarus 5 - 5 
 
Political prisoners 
(3), 
 
protests and 
arrests (2) 
4 
 
freedom of 
expression (1) 
 
Freedom of 
association and of 
assembly (2) 
 
5 
 
Ex: 
 
Repression of freedom of 
expression and assembly is in 
contradiction with Belarus’ 
stated policy of 
democratization and its 
4 
 
Steps taken by Belarus to 
respect universal 
fundamental freedoms, rule 
of law and human rights will 
remain key for the shaping of 
the European Union's 
relationship with the 
3 
violation of international 
electoral standards and 
international human rights law 
(2) 
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Civil and political 
rights (1) 
 
crackdown on civil 
society and 
democratic 
opposition (1) 
international commitments. 
The latest developments in 
Belarus highlight a clear need 
for a broader democratisation 
process in the country. 
Former presidential candidate 
Mykalai Statkevich stands out 
in particular as an example of 
the tireless work and 
committment of many for a 
democratic Belarus 
 
country. 
The importance the EU 
attaches to the question of 
political prisoners in the 
context of EU-Belarus 
relations remains 
unchanged. 
The importance of releasing 
all political prisoners 
remains crucial in the 
context of improving EU-
Belarus relations 
Today's releases represent 
important progress in the 
efforts towards the 
improvement of relations 
between the EU and Belarus. 
 
international commitments (1) 
 
 
Azerbaijan 17 1 
 
Statement 
on latest 
development
s in 
Azerbaijan 
16 
 
Arrest, Detention 
or sentencing (9) 
 
murder of a 
journalist (1) 
 
release (6) 
11 
 
Freedom of 
expression (6) 
  
shrinking space for 
freedom of 
expression and for 
human rights 
defenders (1) 
 
media freedom (4) 
 3: 
Respect for these 
commitments is an essential 
foundation to a democratic 
society. 
Respect for freedom of 
expression is vital in any 
democratic society. 
The EU supports the principles 
of freedom of expression and 
freedom of the media, which 
4 
Azerbaijan's compliance with 
its international 
commitments and 
contributes to the 
enhancement of relations 
between the European 
Union and Azerbaijan. 
The compassionate decision 
of the Azerbaijani authorities 
to allow the Yunus' to leave 
the country further 
12 
Link to international 
commitments – 12 times (Ex: 
The European Union expects 
Azerbaijan to respect its 
international commitments 
both as regards fundamental 
freedoms and due process). 
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are fundamental elements of a 
democratic society. 
 
contributes to the 
enhancement of relations 
between the European 
Union and Azerbaijan. 
The European Union hopes 
further steps will follow. We 
are ready to further deepen 
and broaden our relations 
with Azerbaijan. 
 
The EU is ready to further 
deepen and broaden our 
dialogue and co-operation 
with Azerbaijan. 
 
Russia 18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 18 
 
Restrictive 
legislation (6) 
 
Ban of activities of 
a religious group 
(2) 
 
Commemoration 
of killing a 
journalist (2) 
 
Response to 
demonstrations 
(2) 
 
Criminal charges 
against HRD (2) 
 
Release of 
19 
 
Freedom of 
expression (8), 
 
Freedom of speech 
(2) 
 
Freedom of 
association and 
assembly (2), 
 
Space for 
independent 
voices (1) 
 
Space for civil 
society (1) 
 
Restrictions on civil 
society, 
 1 
 
Attacks on journalists and 
human rights defenders … 
pose a particular threat to 
democracy, the respect for 
human rights and the rule of 
law. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
NO LINKAGE 
12 
 
Constitution (5) 
 
Russia's international 
commitments and human 
rights standards (7) 
 
Ex (regional bodies): The EU 
calls on the Russian authorities 
not to proceed with the 
implementation of this law, 
which would violate Russia's 
international human rights 
obligations in the UN, the 
Council of Europe and the 
OSCE. 
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prisoners (1) 
 
Sentencing (1) 
 
Closure of 
international NGO 
(1) 
 
Shutdown of 
Crimean Tatar ATR 
TV (1) 
 
independent 
media and political 
opposition (1) 
 
Restrictions on 
(independent) civil 
society (3) 
 
"foreign agent" 
legislation (1) 
 
 
 
 
Egypt 9 2  
 
Statement 
on Situation 
in Egypt (1), 
Statement 
on civil 
society (1) 
7 
 
Restrictive law (1),  
 
decision to freeze 
the assets of HRDs 
(1),  
 
pardoning 
prisoners (1),  
 
sentencing (3),  
 
release of a 
journalist (1) 
11 
 
Freedom of 
assembly (2),  
 
freedom of 
expression (4),  
 
press freedom (1), 
 
restricting space 
for civil society (1), 
 
restrict the space 
of debate and 
discussion (1), 
 
pressure on 
independent 
Egyptian civil 
society (2) 
7 
 
Freedom of assembly and press 
freedom are essential for 
democracy, to guarantee that 
all peaceful voices are heard 
and respected. 
 
Civil society plays a key role for 
open and democratic societies. 
 
A flourishing civil society, able 
to work in good conditions, is 
important for democratic and 
economic development and to 
help build political stability. 
 
The decision to revive the so-
called "2011 foreign funding 
case", targeting EU partners 
who are crucial in the 
democratic development of 
Egypt, is of serious concern. 
Civil society plays a key role for 
3 
 
Linkage to cooperation (2)  
 
Some provisions, such as the 
ones related to the 
registration process, the 
activities NGOs are allowed 
to perform and the 
procedure for receiving 
domestic and foreign 
funding, are also likely to 
directly affect European 
cooperation assistance to 
Egypt. 
 
Indeed, a large part of our 
cooperation relies on non-
governmental organisations 
as important implementing 
partners. 
 
Cooperative frame (1): 
13 
 
Linkage to Constitution (6) 
 
Linkage to international norms 
and standarts (7) 
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open and democratic societies. 
 
Freedom of expression is an 
essential element of a 
democratic society. 
 
diverse and independent media 
are essential in a democratic 
society (2) 
 
 
 
 
Egypt is an important 
partner for the EU, and we 
stay committed to 
strengthening our bilateral 
cooperation and pursuing a 
constructive dialogue in all 
fields of our cooperation. 
 
Turkey 2 - 2 
 
Detention (1) 
 
Release (1) 
2 
 
Freedom of 
expression (1) 
 
Freedom of 
assembly (1) 
1 
Freedom of expression and of 
assembly are fundamental 
pillars of a democratic society. 
 
 2 
… is the latest among worrying 
cases that need a very swift 
resolution on the basis of the 
principle of presumption of 
innocence and the application 
of pre-trial detention in line 
with the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
We call on the Turkish 
authorities to clarify the 
charges swiftly, in line with the 
standards of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
and the case-law of the 
European Court of Human 
Rights 
Mexico 4 - 4  
Murder of 
journalist (3), 
murder of HRD (1) 
Freedom of 
expression and 
freedom of press 
(1) 
2 
Linkage to democracy (2) 
- - 
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Country Number of 
statements 
Number of 
generic 
statements 
and their 
type  
Number of 
issue specific 
statements 
and their type 
(event) 
Conceptualization 
of shrinking space, 
reference to 
concrete rights 
Linkage to 
democracy 
Linkage to 
cooperation 
with EU 
Linkage to international, 
regional, national norms and 
standards  
China 6 1 
 
Statement on 
recent 
developments 
in the human 
rights situation 
5 
 
sentencing (2), 
 
arrest and 
detention (1),  
 
charges against 
lawyer (1),  
 
mistreatment of 
detained human 
rights lawyers (1) 
 
 
freedom of assembly 
(1),  
 
freedom of expression 
(3) 
- - 8 
 
Constitution (4) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1), China's international 
human rights commitments (2) 
 
 
Uzbekistan 1 - 1 
 
Release (1) 
 
 
Political space (1) 
- 1 
 
- 
Vietnam 5 - 5 
 
Arrest (2), 
Conviction (3) 
 
 
Freedom of opinion 
and expression (4) 
- - 12 
 
Reference to the Constitution (4), 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (5), Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (3) 
 
 
